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Introduction
Business owners seeking to start or expand a small
business have limited options for financing. They can
go to a bank for a loan, but they may have trouble
qualifying for the loan due to the age of the business,
absence of collateral, lack of equity in the business,
thin margins, or other factors. While online business
lenders may offer faster response times and lower
underwriting hurdles, they often do so in exchange
for exorbitant rates and reduced ability to customize
their financing or add broader value to the business
beyond the money. Business owners could try going
to venture capitalists for equity, but venture capitalists and angel investors will demand some control
over the company and need an exit strategy, generally
requiring that the company be sold. The company
might also not have a fast enough growth curve to
interest a venture capitalist. Raising money through
a crowdfunding platform, such as Kickstarter, is
another option. But until recently, crowdfunding has
been limited to raising donations, not investments,
through such strategies.
These options can be good for some business owners, depending on their business goals. But for many
business owners, especially those who need growth
capital but might like to maintain control and ownership of their businesses for the long-term, other forms
of financing are needed.
In this perspectives brief, we look at two nonprofit
“alternative business financiers” who have been broadening the financing options available for communitybased businesses:

•

Vested for Growth, a product of the New
Hampshire Community Loan Fund, provides
businesses with a range of
debt/equity hybrid financing deal structures involving
any combination of debt,
royalty payments that share
a percentage of sales revenue for a period of time or
up to a pre-determined amount, and/or warrants to
purchase stock in the company. Vested for Growth
shapes its capital to businesses’ needs, pricing its
investments in ways that balance risk and reward.

•

The Local Enterprise Assistance Fund (LEAF) in
Boston, Massachusetts, combines its debt financing with
Direct Public Offerings (DPOs)
of subordinate debt raised
directly by companies from
local supporters.

These options can help businesses grow while
maintaining their current ownership structure and
connections to the community.
Early results from both initiatives suggest that both
the borrowing businesses and community lenders can
succeed with these financing strategies: businesses are
getting flexible financing while maintaining control
of the company, and community lenders are earning
returns that help to sustain their operations.
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Vested for Growth
The Colors of Money: How Vested for Growth
Helped One New Hampshire Business Grow
In 2009, even as the nation was in the grips of the
Great Recession, Bob Goldstein and Stephen Singlar
were ready to grow their company, Single Digits. The
firm, which provides high-speed internet software
and services to clients like hotels, hospitals, office
buildings, and schools, had been successful since
its founding in 2003. But the CEO, Bob Goldstein,
recalled that in 2009, their “growth was being hampered from lack of access to the right kind of capital.”
Single Digits had been dependent on bank financing, but banks would only offer a loan to the business based on the personal credit of the two owners.
Moreover, Goldstein noted that they “didn’t have the
explosive growth that venture capital firms look for.”
What Single Digits did have was “a sustainable growth
model that just needed fuel.”
Goldstein and Singlar had an idea to acquire a
local competitor to grow their business, but they
needed $2 million for the deal. “We had dozens of
meetings with banks, angel investors, and venture
capital firms,” said Goldstein. “We started to get some
interest from venture guys, but the valuations felt
predatory and would have left us without control.”
Then Goldstein met with John Hamilton of Vested
for Growth. Vested for Growth put together a financing proposal for Single Digits, but more importantly
at the time, “John helped us more clearly understand
the kind of financing we needed,” Goldstein remembers. “He articulated the roles of banks, mezzanine
debt, royalty finance, venture capital, private equity—
he helped me find ‘the right color of money.’” Single
Digits ended up finding a community bank willing
to provide $1 million of senior debt if the company
could raise $1 million of subordinate debt, which it
was able to do by borrowing from family and friends.
Two years later, Single Digits saw another growth
opportunity to expand its services to shopping malls.
This time, Goldstein and Singlar knew where to go.
“We went right to Vested for Growth.”
Vested for Growth partnered with Seed Venture
Financing, another fund from Massachusetts, to
provide another $1.2 million of subordinate debt. The
five-year, subordinated note carried an interest rate of

12 percent, and a warrant enabling Vested for Growth
to purchase stock representing 0.63 percent of the
company at any point over the following ten years, at
a price of $0.01 per share. The note provided flexibility on the timing of repayment to Vested for Growth
if debt service coverage were to fall below the senior
lender’s required ratio of 1.20. Goldstein said that the
financing “helped us maintain a 25 to 30 percent per
year growth rate without having to do a ‘Shark Tank’
type of deal where we’d be giving up a majority interest in the business.”
With Vested for Growth’s financing in hand, Single
Digits went on to grow revenues from $9 million in
2011 to $12 million in 2012. At that point, Goldstein
and Singlar were ready for the big time—they successfully raised $10 million from Tudor Growth Equity.
The firm continued to pay Vested for Growth on
term, and since 2011 has added 111 jobs to its payroll.
In the first quarter of 2017, Tudor Growth Equity
exited and was replaced with funding from Bregal
Sagemount, a private equity firm.
Goldstein highlighted the role of Vested for
Growth: “There was a space in time, between personally guaranteed bank debt and Tudor Growth
Equity, where we needed the funding from Vested for
Growth. I didn’t realize it at the time, but when we
started building our business I didn’t truly understand
all the different flavors of debt and equity. Vested for
Growth helped me to understand all those pieces.”

Development of the Vested for Growth Concept
Vested for Growth’s mission is to “widen the economic
winners’ circle” by helping businesses grow while
employing and investing in the futures of all employees, including those on the front line.
John Hamilton, Managing Director of Vested for
Growth, said his team came up with the idea of expanding the financing options for New Hampshire businesses by talking to bankers and businesses. Mainstream
bankers told him that there were times when they
would be working with a business that they liked, but
couldn’t invest in it due to regulations or bank policies. Hamilton also saw a pattern in the post-recession
landscape. “There were good banks making loans, and
equity investors, but not much in between,” he said.
“What was needed was risk tolerant capital—there were
good growth plans getting shelved because the business
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owner would get turned down by a bank and say, ‘I
don’t want equity where I have to give up control or
ownership.’ And so they shelved their growth plans. We
wanted to give businesses a second option of living out
their growth plan by having capital that would fill that
gap—capital that could be risk tolerant without asking
businesses to give up control or ownership.”
By providing flexible financing to these businesses,
Vested for Growth helps to retain and create better jobs
for all employees, including those without four-year
college degrees.
The team set about building a business model that
differentiates Vested for Growth from other financiers
in the following ways:

•

Combining financing with a variety of customized
business-education options, including the formation of advisory boards, participation in CEO
peer groups, and connections to expert business
coaches to support the company’s success.

•

•

Having private capital through the New Hampshire
Community Loan Fund gives Vested for Growth the
flexibility to shape its financing to businesses’ needs
by offering a range of options that fill the gap between
pure debt and pure equity products. This includes
royalty financing and debt with stock warrants,
which allow owners to retain control of the company.
Having a customizable range of financial products
means that Vested for Growth allows CEOs to make
the best choice for their companies, as opposed to
having to fit into one type of deal structure.

Focusing on companies with $1 million to $30
million in revenue and deals of $1 million or less.
Vested for Growth believes that this market is
underserved by institutional investors. While it
is traditionally territory for angel investors, these
investors are largely focused on early-stage or startup companies and often limit themselves to the
high-tech field and companies that are considered
hyper-growth.

•

•

Recognizing that businesses that invest in their frontline employees, especially in a tight labor market,
outperform their peers. A good way to create betterquality jobs is to help businesses that hire lowerincome people discover profitable ways to improve
their recruitment, retention and workplace cultures.
Vested for Growth encourages companies to engage
their employees so that the workers understand how
their job is connected to the business’s bottom line
and how their ideas can add value to the customer.
A variety of progressive management methods can
achieve this outcome, but each must be appropriate
to the business’s size, stage, and industry sector, as
well as the company’s leadership style. It may include
profit sharing, “open book management,” financialliteracy training, or cross-training to support skillbased pay. Hamilton said that “the powerful part
is that this is a ‘win/win’ strategy that leads to the
growth of the business, because it helps create a moreengaged and-committed employee who, in turn, is
able to develop more loyal customers.”

Focusing on earning steady returns from companies
with solid growth plans—as opposed to “chasing
gazelles,” as Hamilton describes the venture capital strategy of buying companies with explosive
growth—then selling them to new owners. Based
on its financial modeling, Vested for Growth set a
goal of least four deals a year with an average size of
$200,000 and an average return of 15 percent, which
allows it to cover its expenses on a self-sufficient
basis (without dependence on grants). This pricing
is relatively inexpensive compared to pure equity.
Since both royalties and interest are tax-deductible
expenses, after-tax financing expenses to businesses
would be in the range of 12 to 14 percent.

How It Works
The kind of financing Hamilton envisioned exists on
Wall Street. It is called mezzanine financing. Hamilton
said that the problem in mezzanine funding is that it
is “easy to get in big bites of $300 million dollars, but
not if you want $300,000.” Vested for Growth set about
finding a way to “bring mezzanine financing from Wall
Street to Main Street.”
The way in which Vested for Growth accomplished
this goal was to develop a suite of financing tools that
blend debt and equity characteristics:
•

Debt with royalty financing involves a company
providing debt payments plus a percentage of its
gross sales as a way of repaying an investment. For
example, Vested for Growth helped entrepreneur
Stephane Anglade purchase and grow Comstock
Industries, a precision machine shop in Meredith,
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New Hampshire, when its founder decided to sell.
Vested for Growth provided an unsecured investment
of $400,000. The investment carried an interest rate
of 8 percent. On top of that interest rate, Comstock
Industries also agreed to pay a royalty of 0.25 percent
of the monthly gross sales of the company, until its
aggregate royalty payments to Vested for Growth
totaled $150,000 or until 5 years after the loan closed,
whichever came sooner.
To promote its mission, Vested for Growth also
provides a “good driver” discount, whereby a portion of the royalty payment is rebated if the company
achieves a different stretch goal every year related to
employee engagement. Under this program, Anglade
and Vested for Growth worked together to identify a goal of increasing participation in Comstock
Industry’s 401(k) plan from 20 percent to 50 percent.
By achieving the goal, Comstock received a refund of
25 percent of the royalty payments it was making to
Vested for Growth. Anglade said that they got “a good
recruiting tool from having the best 401(k) plan out
there.” Anglade also appreciated that under Vested for
Growth’s financing structure, there is no prepayment
penalty on the loan.
•

•

Debt with equity warrants involves a company
providing stock options as a way of sharing upside
with an investor, who will also charge some interest
rate to provide a floor for their return. Vested for
Growth’s investment in Single Digits is an example
of such a deal.
Debt plus royalty and warrant financing contain
elements of both of the options above. An example
is a $500,000 subordinated debt investment Vested
for Growth provided to VXI, a headset manufacturer in Rollinsford, New Hampshire, in 2009. The
investment carried a fixed interest rate for five years,
a royalty payment of 0.25 percent of monthly gross
sales, and stock warrants for a small percent of the
company. Tom Manero, former CFO of VXI, said,
“We would not have been able to raise this financing from a bank—our senior lender had already
extended as much as they could do within their normal parameters. We talked to other alternative lenders and mezzanine providers—but they could not be
flexible or creative with their financing. Vested for
Growth had more patient capital, was easier to work
with, and more flexible.” VXI paid off the loan in
2012, and was sold to a competitor in October 2016.

FIGURE 1. VXI EMPLOYEES AT WORK

Photo courtesy of NH Community Loan Fund

Pure Royalty is another approach that includes no
debt or fixed monthly payment. All the return comes
as a percentage of revenue paid monthly until the
aggregate of all payments equals the multiplier (such
as 1.5 to 3 times the original investment). This is particularly useful in mergers and acquisitions in which
there is some short-term uncertainty. This “shock
absorber” allows a business to pay in accordance to
how well it is performing. This also helps when the
company is so optimistic about its future growth of
sales that it wants to cap the overall return.
These innovative offerings accompany more
traditional business loans and investments that the New
Hampshire Community Loan Fund makes, including
subordinate and senior debt, and pure equity investments.
Vested for Growth works with business owners to
determine the best way to structure the financing to
meet their goals while providing a return that matches
the level of risk in the investment.
For example, one client, Rustic Crust, anticipated
fast growth in sales and profits through natural foods
retailers for its ready-made pizza crusts, pizza sauces,
and flatbreads. Rather than share royalties or stock
warrants with Vested for Growth, Rustic Crust preferred to structure a debt offering with a higher interest rate reflecting the risk-adjusted return that Vested
for Growth needed to make the deal work. Overall,
Hamilton said, Vested for Growth’s goal is to “provide
a suite of financing tools so that a company can create
its own future based on its own agenda,” rather than
having to bend to the interests of outside investors.
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Vested for Growth’s offerings are varied and flexible. As such, Vested for Growth works with business
owners at the outset of any project to explore all the
financing options and structure the best deal. “As happened at first in the case of Single Digits, sometimes
that may even mean a financing structure that doesn’t
involve Vested for Growth,” notes Hamilton, “but we
are still happy to help.”
Additional business education may include referrals to a network of specialized consultants, help
in building advisory boards, connections to peer
groups of other business leaders in similar industries,
growth plan analysis to refinance, and risk evaluations. Stephane Anglade of Comstock Industries said
that the biggest advantage of working with Vested for
Growth “was not the financing, it was the other ways
that Vested for Growth helped me—connecting me to
people in the community, inviting me to join a peer
group of business owners, and helping me qualitatively improve the 401(k) plan.”
Hamilton emphasizes that “a good investor doesn’t
just provide capital—they work to make that company
much more successful. That’s why our investment is
[often] structured as a percentage instead of interest—
so we are truly in this together.”
Business owners agree that Vested for Growth has
been truly on their side. Tom Manero, former VXI CFO,
said that “Vested for Growth had a very different focus
from other lenders—they were much more focused on
the long-term viability of the company and how they
could support it. The number one thing for Vested for
Growth was, ‘Is the company doing well and taking care
of its employees?’ They wanted to get paid back, and the
best way to accomplish that was to help businesses grow
their companies by growing their people.”
In the event of a default, Hamilton said that they
“seek to first understand what caused the default and
then to find a way to help the business to address the
systemic issue so that it gets resolved and the right lessons are learned. This sometimes involves our enlisting
value added business consultants or advisors to support the analysis and process. Doing this also helps
alleviate senior lender concerns and they tend to be
more patient as a result. Patience and flexibility is often
key, and as long as the company is being diligent and
focused, we find that to be useful.”

5

Results to Date
Since 2009, Vested for Growth has provided $5.67
million to twelve companies, impacting 842 jobs and
helping to create 338 new jobs. This statistic does not
include traditional debt or equity investments in businesses by Vested for Growth’s parent corporation, the
New Hampshire Community Loan Fund, which has
provided businesses with an additional $12 million in
the past three years through its Business Builder lending program. Overall, Vested for Growth has earned a
14.2 percent internal rate of return on its investments
to date net of losses (before operating expenses and
cost of funds).
Clearly, Vested for Growth is not the least costly
funding source—bank debt is the best option for
that—but business owners report that they received
good value for their financing. Tom Manero of VXI
said that “Vested for Growth was instrumental in
helping the company to grow.” Stephane Anglade of
Comstock Industries noted that the process of negotiating the investment was more difficult and costly for
him and his primary lender than expected, particularly around the risk mitigation of Vested for Growth’s
unsecured investment, but that Vested for Growth is
“a very viable financing option, all of that said—in
hindsight it was a good deal and the rate was fair.”
As can be seen from the case studies, not all of
the companies financed by Vested for Growth have
stayed under local ownership. “We realize that companies can be sold and we don’t prohibit that option
when we invest,” Hamilton said. “We do take steps
to maximize the retention of good jobs. First, we do
not use traditional equity in order to avoid adding
any incentive or need for the company to sell. One
of the best ways to keep the business rooted is to
have the team operate at peak efficiency, outperforming their industry peers. This is where we focus
our efforts after closing to reduce the likelihood
that a new buyer would risk uprooting the team
and undermine smooth operations. We also anticipate the possibility of a sale and advocate putting
some structured incentive in place so that front-line
employees share in the ‘upside.’ We do this through a
variety of means, including severance/stock packages, etc. Given the tight labor market, we have
found that it is easier to negotiate this into deals
because it helps with retention.”
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Based on his experience financing Single Digits,
Bob Goldstein recommends reaching out to a group
like Vested for Growth. “If you have a solid business
that is growing, it is always worth your time to have a
conversation with a group like Vested for Growth—
they will sit down with you for an hour or two and help
you understand what financing structures are in the
market where you fit. They’ll be honest with you—you
never know with banks and venture capital whether
they have your interests in mind or only their own.”

Direct Public Offerings
Direct Public Offerings: The Story of Wellspring
Cooperative Corporation and the Wellspring
Harvest Greenhouse
Wellspring Cooperative Corporation helps to incubate
and grow worker-owned businesses in Springfield,
Massachusetts, in partnership with large local employers, such as the University of Massachusetts, local
public school systems, and Bay State Health, a regional
hospital. Wellspring works with these “anchor institutions” to develop local, worker-owned businesses that
meet their purchasing needs.
One such opportunity that Wellspring identified
was an interest from the anchor institutions in purchasing local food. After reviewing several options for
local food businesses, Wellspring identified the opportunity to develop a greenhouse that could grow fresh
greens and herbs year-round. Wellspring developed a
business plan for “Wellspring Harvest,” working with

FIGURE 2. LEAF-WELLSPRING COLLABORATION

Photo courtesy of the Local Enterprise Assistance Fund

a local hydroponic grower who helped with technical
details and meeting with the anchor institutions and a
local supermarket chain, Big Y, to determine the right
mix of crops to grow. Fred Rose, co-director of the
Wellspring Cooperative Corporation, recalls that one
of the hardest parts of starting the business was “finding two acres of undeveloped, non-polluted, affordable
land in Springfield—but we did it,” ultimately signing
a purchase and sale agreement for a site owned by the
Springfield Redevelopment Authority (SRA).
There was just one hitch. Wellspring needed to raise
$900,000 to close on the land and build the greenhouse.
The clock was ticking on this financing as well, since
the SRA was only willing to tie up the land for a limited
amount of time and required that Wellspring Harvest
put down a $5,000 non-refundable deposit per month
to keep the purchase option alive. Rose reached out to
LEAF, a nonprofit loan fund based in Boston whose mission is to “provide financing and development assistance
to cooperatives and social purpose ventures that create
and save jobs for low-income people.”
Gerardo Espinoza, the Executive Director of LEAF,
was excited about the project. “There were a number of
attractive elements,” he related, “it was a worker cooperative, the location was in Springfield in a low-income
area, and the group had a social justice philosophy. Also,
this was more than just one play—Wellspring is looking
to develop many more worker co-ops in Springfield.”
LEAF helped Wellspring to refine the business plan and
delve into the numbers. Rose said that “LEAF really
helped us think through the equity requirements and to
connect to other lenders, understanding what we needed
to raise.” LEAF and Coastal Enterprises Inc., another
alternative financier, were willing to provide $500,000 of
senior debt to finance the project, but only if Wellspring
could raise $400,000 in subordinate financing still to
raise for the project to go forward.
Wellspring had also worked in the past with a local
investment advisor, Robert Zevin, who specializes in
working with wealthy clients interested in “impact
investing,” double-bottom-line deals where investors
could receive a financial return while helping to generate a positive social impact for their community. Zevin
believed that some of his clients might be interested
in purchasing shares of preferred equity in the greenhouse business. However, as Wellspring and Zevin
worked together to further assess interest from these
prospective investors, Rose realized that they “would
not raise enough equity to satisfy lenders.”
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Espinoza had an idea for Wellspring. LEAF had provided loans to several other businesses in Massachusetts
that had raised subordinate financing through a DPO.
With a DPO, a company offers an investment directly to
the public, instead of through a Wall Street intermediary.
“We came in kicking and screaming, because this was
new territory for us,” said Rose. “The DPOs we knew of,
like Artisan Beverage—they had an existing base of customers who already liked their product, from whom they
could raise the funds. We didn’t know how well it would
go.” On the other hand, according to Rose, “it seemed like
the only alternative.” Wellspring didn’t have relationships
with angel investors or venture capitalists, but more to
the point, it could neither pay these investors the returns
they would have demanded, nor could it offer them
decision-making power in what was to be a worker-run
cooperative. “All of our lenders and investors are mission
driven,” said Rose. “We didn’t know of other conventional
lenders or investors who would do this deal.”
Wellspring worked with LEAF, DPO consultant
Jenny Kassan, and Robert Zevin to devise and execute
a capitalization plan for the needed subordinated
financing. The idea was to raise two tiers of funds:
$150,000 in preferred equity and $250,000 from a DPO
of subordinated debt.
•

The preferred equity would be raised from socially
responsible investors—generally high-net-worth
individuals working with investment advisors and
wealth management firms. In general, the term
“preferred equity” refers to an equity instrument
that may take on some characteristics of debt. In
this case, the preferred equity carried a fixed return
for investors of 3 percent. For the first five years of
the cooperative, the return would accrue to investors but not be paid out in cash. Starting in year
five, Wellspring would pay back the investors out
of its earnings—over time, replacing the preferred
equity with worker-owned cooperative stock shares.
During this five-year redemption period, the investors would receive a higher yield, of 6 percent,
on their outstanding capital—thus providing the
investors with a total internal rate of return over
a ten-year period of about 4 percent. Beyond this
return, preferred equity shareholders would receive
a dividend if the co-op made income in excess of
$50,000 a year. The amount of the dividend would
be one-third of the excess income over $50,000,
distributed equally among all preferred shares.

•
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The most junior financing in the deal structure
would be a DPO of subordinated debt, marketed
to small, retail investors as well as high-net-worth
investors. The DPO investment would pay investors a return of 3 percent over a term of five years.
However, investors would be required to write
Wellspring to request to take out their money,
otherwise the investment would roll over and
remain in the company. Also, interest payments for
the first two years of the loan would be deferred
and paid to investors upon redemption of the
note. The minimum investment was $5,000 for
qualified investors and $1,000 for any investor.
According to Amine Benali, Director of Strategy
and Development at LEAF, the low return was
“designed to target people or investors who wanted
to express views toward the mission of the greenhouse, secondary to financial return.”

A DPO is a type of financial security, and as such is
subject to federal and state securities regulations. “As
a for-profit in Massachusetts,” noted Rose, “it would
take us six months to go through the state securities
registration process.” But the purchase and sale agreement Wellspring signed with the SRA for the land
had an expiration date on it—Wellspring didn’t have
six months to raise the money. Nonprofits, however,
are exempt from federal securities law and from state
securities law in Massachusetts, and investments in
Wellspring Harvest would be furthering a charitable
mission of creating jobs for low-income workers. “So
we formed a nonprofit,” Rose related, “creating the
Wellspring Investment Fund that we spun off as an
affiliated nonprofit with the Wellspring Cooperative
Corporation. This entity is what issued the DPO.
That meant that our nonprofit was taking on financial
responsibility for this investment. The board of our
nonprofit would become accountable, so we did a lot of
work to make sure the risks were manageable.”
Consultant Jenny Kassan prepared a detailed
Prospectus for the DPO, describing the offer of
unsecured promissory notes, the Wellspring Harvest
business plan, and the anticipated social impacts.
The Prospectus also reviewed risk factors and investor suitability issues, such as the fact that the notes
were unrated, unsecured, and uninsured; investments were not liquid (no secondary market exists to
sell one’s DPO investment in Wellspring Harvest to
other investors); note holders would not exercise any
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management control over the Wellspring Investment
Fund or the Wellspring Harvest greenhouse business; and neither the federal Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) nor state securities regulators had
reviewed the offering. Due to the use of nonprofit
exemptions from state securities laws, the offering was limited to investors in Massachusetts and
Connecticut (state securities laws on nonprofit securities offerings can vary significantly). According to
Espinoza at LEAF, the legal costs for Wellspring to put
together the documentation were $5,000.
While Zevin connected clients interested in the project with Wellspring to purchase preferred equity, Fred
Rose and Wellspring’s other co-director, Emily Kawano,
set out to market their DPO. Rose said that “the individuals who did the DPO were much more local. Many
of them were folks we knew who had an interest in
local development; they were putting in their $1,000 or
$5,000 to impact their community.” Wellspring also had
a number of events both in the Springfield area and in
Boston with prospective investors.
At the end of six months, Wellspring had raised
$253,000 from forty-nine investors for its DPO, as well as
$150,000 in preferred equity. Two investors made large
DPO purchases. One individual invested $40,000, and a
local foundation, The Beveridge Family Foundation, put
in $35,000. Beveridge’s investment qualified as a “program
related investment” that counted toward the foundation’s
charitable giving requirements. But Wellspring also had
many investors participating at smaller levels: twenty-one
investors at the minimum of $1,000, and another twenty
investors between $1,500 and $9,999. The median investment across all investors was $2,000.
In May 2017, Wellspring realized that cost increases
in the greenhouse site development required the business to raise an additional $150,000 for operating capital.
The Wellspring Investment Fund reopened the DPO to
raise half of these funds, which are being matched by
additional loans. As of mid-August 2017, 80 percent of
these additional DPO funds have been raised.
Wellspring has become an enthusiastic supporter of
public offerings based on its experiences over the past
year. “We have been enormously impressed by the number of people who want to invest their money in making
their community a better place,” concluded Rose. “We
never would have known that if we hadn’t taken the risk
to put together the DPO. This kind of subordinate debt
is the key to financing community development projects
and makes the whole rest of the financing possible.”

How DPOs Work
One way of understanding a DPO is by contrasting it with
an Initial Public Offering (IPO), which is the way that
companies raise money by selling stocks on Wall Street.
•

One key difference between a DPO and an IPO is
that no intermediary agencies handle the issuance
of the investment opportunity—the company is
reaching out directly to potential investors. Thus,
the costs of intermediation are reduced—although
the company also must then market the security
itself, or obtain help to do so.

•

A key advantage of approaching investors directly
is that the terms of the DPO can be structured in
such a way as to maintain control of the company.
This advantage is especially important when the
company is community-based or worker-owned
and remaining that way is critical to the mission
of the company, as was the case with Wellspring
Harvest.

•

As is clear from the Wellspring Harvest story,
DPOs do not have to be issuances of stock. A
DPO can be made of any kind of security—debt,
equity, or debt/equity hybrids such as royalty notes,
convertible debt, or debt with equity kickers (like
warrants). A business can thus structure the terms
of financing offered in a DPO in exactly the way
that works best for its business plan.

Regulatory burdens can be significantly lower for a
DPO. Generally, securities offerings are subject to a
number of federal laws and regulations, including the
Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, Regulation D
of the federal Securities Exchange Commission, and
numerous other laws and regulations, as well as state
“blue sky” securities laws and regulations. However,
there are a number of factors that DPOs can take
advantage of to achieve a smoother path to issuance.1
These include:
•

A nonprofit issuer can be exempt from both federal
and state securities laws, depending on the regulations of the specific state they are in (as was the
case for Wellspring Harvest).

•

The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS
Act) was passed in 2012 with SEC rules allowing
“regulation crowdfunding” going into effect in
2016. The rules exempt companies from federal
securities registration requirements when they sell
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less than $1 million of securities in a year, provided
they meet certain other conditions, and permit
individual investors with incomes of less than
$100,000 to invest up to the greater of $2,000 or
5 percent of their annual income. A business may
also obtain an exemption from federal securities
laws if it limits its offering to just one state.
In all cases, businesses should still consult with professional legal advice to ensure that they structure their
DPO properly to comply with applicable laws and regulations. Businesses will still need to take care to provide
clear and adequate information to potential investors,
and comply with anti-fraud laws and regulations.
Another way of understanding a DPO is thinking of
it as “crowdfunding a security.” With the passage of the
JOBS Act, as described above, this strategy is now a bona
fide business financing option. Moreover, the JOBS Act
also provides for the development of online platforms
through which DPOs can be marketed, with guidance
that the operators of such platforms must follow.

Other Examples of DPOs
In New England, other companies using DPOs to raise
capital have included (but are not limited to):
•

•

•

Democracy Brewing, which is raising $350,000
in preferred equity at a targeted 5 percent return
through stock dividends, has a goal to purchase
shares back from investors within five years.2
Cero, a composting and recycling worker cooperative in Dorchester, Massachusetts, which raised
$340,000 from eighty-three investors, has investments ranging between $2,500 to $25,000.3 LEAF
was among the investors in this DPO.
In Vermont, an initiative of VSECU Credit Union
called “Milk Money” provides a platform for
potential investors to view DPO offerings from
Vermont companies.4
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Conclusion: Advice for Business
Owners and Alternative Financiers
Business owners seeking to finance business start-up
and acquisition should be aware of a broad range of
different “colors of money” that are available to them.
As they develop their capitalization strategy, owners
should consider the following factors that can impact
the appropriateness of different financing options:
•

Their own goals vis-à-vis long-term ownership of
the company versus eventual sale to new owners

•

Goals for retaining control of the company, including whether the company envisions itself as a
community-based or worker-owned business

•

Degree of support and connections the company
may have with prospective small investors in the
community

•

Willingness of the company to directly engage
in marketing investment opportunities to the
community

•

Size of the investment needed

•

Amount of the investment that can be covered
through senior debt, given projected cash flow and
valuation of the company

•

Willingness of the company to share sales revenues
or an ownership stake in the company as a way of
obtaining growth financing

•

Bandwidth of the company to engage in more complex legal work and deal structuring negotiations

Alternative financiers, such as nonprofit Community
Development Financial Institution loan funds, can play
important roles in broadening the palette of financing
options available to community businesses. If supporting the growth of local community businesses is their
mission, these financing organizations may want to
consider:
• Developing hybrid debt-equity products to fill the
needs for equity-like financing for businesses that
are not good candidates for venture capital
• Building technical assistance capacity to help
business owners sift through the range of financing options that are available to them and connect
them with appropriate legal advice
• Helping to establish or partnering with platforms
that can help companies market Direct Public
Offerings
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Endnotes

1. For further discussion of Securities regulation issues, see
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission website: https://
www.sec.gov/fast-answers. An SEC factsheet on “regulation
crowdfunding” is available at: https://www.sec.gov/news/
pressrelease/2015-249.html. This report is not intended to
provide legal advice. Businesses should obtain professional
legal representation to ensure that they structure their DPO
properly to comply with applicable laws and regulations.
2. Democracy Brewing, “Invest!” http://www.
democracybrewing.com/invest/.
3. Cutting Edge Capital, “$340,000 Raised by Composting
and Recycling Worker Cooperative in Massachusetts,”
https://www.cuttingedgecapital.com/cerodpo/.
4. Milk Money, https://milkmoneyvt.com/.
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